2014年经济学人 俄罗斯和卢布 自己种下的恶果自己承受

（单词翻译）

Russia and the rouble

As ye sow, so shall ye reap

The collapse¹ in the rouble is caused by Vladimir Putin's belligerence², greed and paranoia³

VLADIMIR PUTIN has successfully suppressed dissent⁴, squeezed out opposition⁵ and clamped down on the media, but he has not been able to control global financial markets. In recent days the rouble has collapsed⁶; it has lost almost 40% of its value over three weeks. This is the biggest crisis of Mr Putin's reign—and it is entirely⁷ his fault.

Mr Putin will no doubt blame all the usual suspects—Western speculators who bet against his currency, Western imperialists who imposed sanctions on his economy, Western economists⁹ who failed to forecast that the oil price (down by half over six months) would fall as far as it has and, of course, Western newspapers that told him that his policies would lead to disaster. But the crisis is the inevitable¹⁰ consequence of Putinism—of aggression¹¹ abroad and a corrupt-and-control economy at home.

Kleptocracy and its consequences

The sanctions were imposed by the West because of his conduct in the Ukraine, where he has, among many things, seized territory, engineered a war and refused to investigate the shooting down of a civilian¹² airliner¹³. Meanwhile, he has failed to reform Russia's economy, leaving it dependent on the energy industry that he has carved up among his friends. Had he chosen to build an economy based on the rule of law and competition rather than patronage¹⁴ and corruption¹⁵, things would have looked very different.

In the short term, there is not a great deal that Mr Putin can do to get his country out of the mess that he has made. A huge interest-rate rise this week, following previous large increases, has not worked. Capital controls are not the answer. They can sometimes be effectively employed against short-term speculation¹⁶, but in this case investors¹⁷ are rightly worried about an economy that is so reliant on one sector¹⁸. Anyway, in such a lawless place, capital controls would be porous¹⁹ and could trigger runs on the banks which the country could ill afford. Russia still has reserves of $370 billion, but it also has foreign-currency debts of more than $600 billion.

To improve the long-term prospects²⁰ of an economy that is heading into a deep recession, two bigger changes are needed. The first is that Russia should pull back from eastern Ukraine and seek some accommodation with the government in Kiev and the West that could lead to the lifting of sanctions. The second is a change to the country's economic model. Mr Putin needs to take advantage of the fall in the value of the currency to diversify²¹ away from excess dependence²² on oil and gas, which make up two-thirds of exports; to improve the competitiveness of manufacturing and high-tech²³ industry; to strengthen the rule of law; and to clean up corruption. To implement²⁴ all this he should replace his pliant²⁵ prime minister (and previous president), Dmitry Medvedev, with a credible²⁶ economist⁸ such as Alexei Kudrin, who was a respected finance minister for 11 years. His oligarch chums might not like this, but Russians would be better off.

Sadly, none of this is likely to happen. Mr Putin will probably double down, railing against Western iniquity²⁷, stifling²⁸ all dissent at home, destabilising Ukraine still more and interfering²⁹ further in other neighbouring countries. And he will pursue a course of growing autarky, severing³⁰ as many of Russia's economic and financial links to the West as he can.

A brazenly³¹ nationalist course will impoverish³² Russia further, making it impossible for Mr Putin to keep delivering rising living standards. He will gamble that the Russian people are foolish enough to trade prosperity for nationalistic fervour. This newspaper hopes he is wrong.