2015年经济学人 军队改革 国防采购私有化惨遭失败

（单词翻译）

Military reform

军队改革

No go, GOCO

“政府拥有、承包商运营”计划被搁置

Why a bold plan to privatise military procurement¹ fell apart

国防采购私有化的壮举为何惨遭失败

Can we turn this thing around?

这事行得通吗？

AS U-TURNS go, it was not particularly painful; defence procurement is hardly a doorstep issue. Still, in terms of the scale of ambition thwarted² it was a big one. On December 10th Britain's defence secretary, Philip Hammond, announced that one of the most radical³ outsourcing plans hatched by any government would not be going ahead.

事情的发展有了180度的转弯。这并不是特别糟糕，毕竟国防采购的问题并非易事。突然中止这项计划的确需要很大的勇气。12月10日，英国国防大臣菲利普?哈蒙德宣布中止一项由政府制定的国防采办方案，该方案曾饱受争议。

Mr Hammond has been (successfully) trying to restore fiscal⁴ probity⁵ to the Ministry⁶ of Defence, long a pariah⁷ in Whitehall for its casual approach to the military equipment budget. He wants to root out the so-called “conspiracy of optimism”, in which officials, the armed forces and defence suppliers pretend that kit⁸ will be delivered much more cheaply than it in fact can be. After a cost-cutting defence review, Mr Hammond inherited a staggering 74 billion ($122 billion) of unfunded commitments from the last Labour government.

由于曾经随意插手军队装备预算，国防部在白厅（指英国政府）里的名声一直不好。如今哈蒙德已经成功扭转了这种局面，重塑了国防部的经济诚信。他想彻底击垮所谓的“乐观主义的密谋”—政府官员、军队和国防供应商谎称国防装备采办的成本将会降低。经过削减开支的国防审计之后，哈蒙德领导的国防部从上一届劳动党政府继承了一项740亿英镑（1，220亿美元）的资金缺口，这一数字令人震惊。

At present a 16,500-strong Bristol-based outfit⁹ called Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), staffed mostly by former soldiers and civil servants, handles procurement. Mr Hammond argued that a radically¹⁰ different approach was needed. Responsibility for buying and maintaining Britain's military equipment should be handed to a GOCO, the acronym¹¹ given to a new government-owned, contractor-operated organisation¹². In effect, Britain would have privatised defence procurement.

目前，国防装备与保障局（DE&S）负责英国的国防采购。该组织位于布里斯托尔，有16,500名员工，其中大部分是退役的士兵、公务员。哈蒙德坚称国防采购需要一种截然不同的方式。采购和维护英国国防装备的任务应该移交给一个“政府拥有，承包商运营”的组织（简称GOCO）。实际上，这是将英国的国防采购私有化。

In July three American-led consortia had been lined up to bid for the contract. But by last month two had dropped out, fearing it would be impossible to make a decent return. That left just one bidder¹³: a consortium that included Bechtel, PricewaterhouseCoopers and PA Consulting. Sources suggest that, despite having submitted a 1,200-page bid, this consortium too was thinking about pulling out.

七月份，由美国公司牵头的3个财团参与了英国国防部国防装备与保障局(DE&S)的私有化招标。但是到了上个月，已经有两家财团放弃投标，因为他们担心到时候无法获利，得不偿失。这样就只剩下了最后一个投标者——由贝克特尔公司、普华永道以及英国博安咨询集团和英国国防技术集团组成的财团。消息人士称：“虽然提交了一份1,200页的竞标书，该财团也在考虑放弃投标。”

Without a credible¹⁴ commercial competition, Mr Hammond will revert¹⁵ to allowing a beefed-up DE&S to offer the salaries needed to attract people from the private sector¹⁶ with the kind of commercial, engineering and financial skills needed to handle big projects and negotiate complex contracts. This is unlikely to deliver the kind of “cultural change” that Mr Hammond had insisted was essential.

由于没有一个可信的商业竞争组织，哈蒙德只能重新让机构臃肿的国防装备与保障局负责从私有部门中引进具有商业、工程以及财政知识的能够承接重大项目、沟通重大合同的人才，并为他们提供薪水。这好像不能实现哈蒙德之前一直坚持认为很重要的“文化革新”。

Yet Francis Tusa, the editor of Defence Analysis, a newsletter, and a supporter of GOCO, reckons that for all Mr Hammond's apparent enthusiasm for it, he may not be entirely¹⁷ dismayed by what has happened. Bidders¹⁸ fell by the wayside because of the limited length of contract being offered (as little as three years according to a source) combined with the requirement for substantial upfront investment and the need for every pound of profit to come from savings¹⁹ over the previous system. Surely Mr Hammond could have sweetened the deal if he had really wanted it?

通讯简报《防务分析》的主编弗朗西斯·图萨是GOCO的支持者。他认为既然哈蒙德对改革投入了那么显著的热情，他不会对目前发生的事情彻底失望的。投标者半路退出是因为合同的期限太短（一位消息人士称只有三年）、需要大量的预付资本，而且利润只能来自于对原体制开支的节俭。如果哈蒙德真的想实现这项改革，他让它变得诱人了吗？

The proposed new system was the brainchild of Bernard Gray, a former journalist, political adviser²⁰ and banker who was hired by the prime minister, David Cameron, to become head of defence materiel in late 2010, before Mr Hammond became defence secretary. Mr Hammond, said by some who have worked with him to be “a bit of a control freak”, concurs²¹ with much of the bullish Mr Gray's argument for the GOCO. But he was probably not thrilled by having to march in lock-step with him on such a contentious²² and politically risky²³ policy. Mr Gray has been made chief executive of the rebooted DE&S.

新提出的体制是伯纳德·格雷的点子。他曾经做过记者、政治顾问、银行家，2010年下半年被首相大卫·卡梅伦任命为国防装备与保障局局长，当时哈蒙德还不是国防大臣。跟哈蒙德一起工作的人说哈蒙德的控制欲比较强。他同意了格雷关于GOCO的顽固的争执。然而他可能不太愿意同格雷陷在这个有争议的政治冒险性的政策上。格雷被任命为重组后的DE&S首席执行官。

Others will be frankly²⁴ relieved at the GOCO's demise²⁵. Its detractors both in Parliament and industry questioned how far a privately-operated entity²⁶ could be trusted to serve national strategic goals. Even the Pentagon, no slouch when it comes to outsourcing, was worried that the Ministry of Defence might lose capabilities²⁷ critical for the support of future missions. In 2011 America's Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued a “Policy Letter” warning departments about surrendering to contractors²⁸ “inherently governmental functions”. The Pentagon was singled out for needing caution when it came to reliance on contractors.

其他人对GOCO的失败表现的很轻松。议会里和工业界的贬低者们质疑让一个私营组织为国家的战略目标提供服务，人们能对其信任多久。五角大楼在面对英国的国防采办问题时也不再坐视不管，它担心国防部会失去支撑未来使命的关键能力。2011年美国联邦采购政策办公室发表了一篇“政策书函”，警告国防部不要将关键的政府职能转交给承包商。五角大楼指出在依赖承包商的问题上要提高警惕。

Mr Hammond says that the GOCO plan is only on hold and could be brought back by a future Conservative government. By the time it is, the politically ambitious defence secretary will surely have moved to another billet.

哈蒙德说，GOCO模式只是被暂时搁置，可以在在下一届保守党政府中恢复这一模式。然而到到时候，这位雄心勃勃的国防大臣肯定已经担任别的职务去了。