2022年经济学人 金融领域爆发人才抢夺战(2)

（单词翻译）

All that equates¹ to an avalanche² of work for investment bankers.

所有这些对投资银行家来说都意味着海量的工作。

The industry’s staffing model, meanwhile, is ill-suited to spikes³ in demand.

与此同时，该行业的招聘模式并不适合员工需求激增的情况。

“If the large banks aren’t able to pay their best people well, they lose them all,” explains one headhunter.

“如果大型银行不能给最优秀的员工支付高薪，他们就会全部流失，”一位猎头解释道。

The only way to do that and remain profitable is to be ruthless about headcount, running teams with “very little fat” in normal times.

要做到这一点，并保持盈利的唯一方法是精简团队成员，在正常时期用“极少的成本”管理团队。

When business balloons, as it did in 2021, those lean teams very quickly end up working at full capacity—at which point the only options are to poach people from elsewhere or to turn down business.

在业务膨胀时，就像2021年那样，这些精简的团队很快就会满负荷工作，到那时，唯一的办法就是从其他地方挖人或者拒绝业务。

The result is a fierce, zero-sum skirmish between banks for skilled staff.

其结果是银行之间为争夺熟练员工展开了一场激烈的零和冲突。

At the same time, the list of other firms offering bankers eye-watering salaries has lengthened⁴.

与此同时，还有更多其他公司向银行家们开出了令人垂涎的薪水。

Private-equity funds have long piggybacked off the training offered by the big investment banks, luring⁵ talent away with better pay and slightly gentler working hours.

长期以来，私募股权基金一直都依靠大型投资银行提供的培训，以更高的薪酬和更人性化的工作时间来吸引人才。

Banks in America are particularly vulnerable, with a supersized private-investment industry offering just as supersized compensation.

美国的银行尤其脆弱，要面临庞大的私人投资行业提供的可观薪水。

(Blackstone, one of the biggest such firms, received 29,000 applications for 100 junior-level jobs in 2021.)

(最大的此类公司之一黑石集团(Blackstone)，在2021年收到了2.9万份应聘100个初级职位的申请。)

In recent years, these have been joined by a growing cohort of dealmakers going it alone and taking firms public via special-purpose acquisition companies.

近年来，越来越多的交易人团体开始单干，通过特殊目的的收购公司将公司上市。

m&a boutiques, which advise on mergers⁶ without the full-service offering of an investment bank, entice⁷ still more bankers away from banking⁸.

在没有投资银行提供全方位服务的情况下，为并购提供建议的小型并购公司吸引了更多的银行家离开银行业。

Third, there has indeed been a shift in workers’ attitudes -- just not one that results from them being unwilling⁹ to hack¹⁰ the hours of their predecessors¹¹.

第三，员工们的态度确实发生了转变——只不过并不是因为他们不愿意减少前辈的工作时间。

Florian Pollner of McKinsey, a consultancy, describes how in conversations with human-resources bosses, a theme that comes up time and again is younger workers’ more modular approach to their careers.

麦肯锡咨询公司的弗洛里安·波勒纳描述了在与人力资源主管的对话中，一个反复出现的主题是，年轻员工对待职业的方式更加模块化。

Instead of looking for jobs for life, they seek out roles they can spend a few years in and then leave with broader options.

他们找的不是能干一辈子的工作，而是能让自己在其中待上几年，然后有了更多选择并离开的职位。

That works in banks’ favour for recruiting junior staff: their graduate schemes are still seen as excellent preparation for a career.

这对银行招聘初级员工有利：它们的毕业生计划仍被视为为职业生涯做了极好的准备。

But it also puts pressure on attrition rates in an industry already known for the mercenary outlook of its employees.

但在一个员工唯利是图的行业，这也给员工流失率带来了压力。

These forces are changing the way banks recruit and retain their staff.

这些力量正在改变银行招聘和留住员工的方式。

Many have long tried to draw employees from a more diverse pool.

许多公司长期以来一直试图从更多样化的人群中吸引员工。

That task is now more urgent, and goes beyond lines like race and gender¹².

这项任务现在更加紧迫，而且超越了种族和性别等界限。

Mr Pollner sees banks at all levels recruiting from a much broader range of universities than they used to—and, just as important, trying to hire people with personalities¹³ “different to the stereotype¹⁴ of the average banker”.

波勒认为，与过去相比，各个级别的银行开始从更宽范围的大学中招聘员工——同样重要的是，银行也在招聘性格“与人们对一般银行家的刻板印象不同”的人。

Retention¹⁵ efforts have a darker side, too: an investment manager at a London private-equity fund reports having hired juniors from two separate banks, only to have both receive letters from their former employers suggesting they might have to repay bonuses (in the end, they did not).

为了留住员工，这些努力也有其阴暗的一面：伦敦的一家私募股权基金的投资经理报告称，他们从两家不同的银行聘用了初级员工，结果他们都收到了前雇主的来信，暗示其可能需要归还奖金(但最终，他们并没有这么做)。

The net result within investment banking is likely to be a widening gap between the largest and most profitable banks, chiefly American ones, and “second-tier” firms, including European banks.

这一切在投资银行内部产生的最终结果可能是，最大和最赚钱的银行(主要是美国银行)与“二线”公司(包括欧洲银行)之间的差距会越来越大。

The latter have long had to pay more, and take greater risk, to compensate¹⁶ for not having the prestige and huge domestic market of the Wall Street giants.

长期以来，后者都被迫付出更多，承担更大的风险，只为弥补缺乏华尔街巨头那样的声望和庞大的国内市场。

That has sometimes had dire¹⁷ consequences: Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank have suffered such frequent losses from scandals and exposure to dubious¹⁸ clients that they have become the butt¹⁹ of industry jokes.

这有时会带来可怕的后果：瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)和德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)曾因丑闻和可疑客户的曝光而频繁遭受亏损，以至于它们成了业界的笑柄。

As second-tier banks struggle to muster²⁰ the financial firepower to recruit senior talent, that problem will only worsen.

二线银行越来越难集中财力聘请高级人才，这个问题只会更加恶化。

The fewer skilled staff they attract, the less deal-flow they capture, and the faster their investment banks must shrink.

他们吸纳的熟练员工越少，获得的交易流就越少，投资银行就会萎缩地更快。

In recent years many European banks have been forced to flee Wall Street, or close their racier outfits²¹ altogether.

近年来，许多欧洲银行被迫逃离华尔街，或者干脆关闭其活跃的分支机构。

More of them may become casualties of the talent war raging at the cutting edge of capitalism²².

在资本主义的刀口之下，有更多人可能会成为受害者。