2022年经济学人 美国在亚太地区制定新的经济框架

（单词翻译）

Finance & Economics

财经版块

The Indo-Pacific economy

印太地区的经济

A new pact¹ for Asia: just don’t call it a trade deal

为亚洲定制的新条约：不要把它当做贸易协议

Amere three days after being sworn in as president in January 2017, Donald Trump² signed an executive order withdrawing America from the Trans-Pacific Partnership³ (tpp), a 12-country free-trade deal he had railed against on the campaign trail.

在2017年1月宣誓就任美国总统三天后，唐纳德·特朗普签署了一项让美国退出跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(tpp)的行政命令，这是他在竞选期间抨击的一项12国自由贸易协定。

On May 23rd, 488 days after his own swearing-in, President Joe Biden tried to reverse some of the damage by unveiling a new pact, the 13-country Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (ipef).

5月23日，在宣誓就职488天后，乔·拜登总统试图通过公布一项新协定——13国印太经济框架(ipef)来弥补一些损害。

That Mr Biden took so much longer to launch his Asian trade policy illustrates⁴ one basic truth: it is far easier to tear up agreements than it is to craft them anew.

拜登花了这么长的时间来启动他的亚洲贸易政策，这说明了一个基本的事实：撕毁协议远比重新制定协议容易。

Inevitably⁵, one way to look at the ipef is by way of comparison to the tpp (which lives on in reduced form, absent America).

不可避免，人们对ipef的一种解读是把它与tpp (以简化形式存在，不包括美国)进行比较。

Some bits sound rather familiar. One selling-point for the tpp was that it was a “21st-century trade agreement” complete with high standards for workers’ rights and e-commerce rules.

有些说法听起来很耳熟。tpp的一个亮点是，它是一项“21世纪的贸易协定”，对工人权利和电子商务规则有着高标准要求。

The ipef is also “a 21st-century economic arrangement”, according to Jake Sullivan, America’s national security adviser⁶.

美国国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文表示，ipef也是“21世纪的经济规划”。

The original tpp members accounted for nearly 40% of global gdp, roughly the same share as the current ipef partners.

最初的tpp成员国占全球gdp的近40%，与目前的ipef成员国的份额大致相同。

Most crucially, China is still excluded.

最关键的是，中国仍然被排除在外。

The ipef, like the tpp, is an attempt to build a trading structure in Asia that enshrines both America’s economic principles and its economic power.

与tpp一样，ipef试图在亚洲建立一个既包含美国经济原则，又包含美国经济实力的贸易结构。

That, however, is where the similarities end.

然而，两者的相似之处也仅限于此。

Mr Trump’s success in winning support with his calls to stop countries “ripping off” America has made many in Washington leery of ambitious free-trade deals.

特朗普呼吁阻止美国被“剥削”，成功赢得了支持，这让华盛顿的许多人对雄心勃勃的自由贸易协定持怀疑态度。

So rather than starting work on a pact that would require approval from Congress, Mr Biden’s team has designed a framework that is more malleable⁷ and may avoid that political death-trap.

因此，拜登的团队并没有开始制定一项需要国会批准的协议，而是设计了一个更具可塑性的框架，这也许能避免陷入政治死亡的困境。

In announcing the launch, Katherine Tai, the United States Trade Representative (ustr), pledged to “keep Congress close” in shaping the ipef--a far cry from putting it to a vote.

在宣布启动该计划时，美国贸易代表邰丽华(Katherine Tai)承诺在制定ipef时会“与国会保持密切联系”——这与最终送去表决相距甚远。

Malleability⁸ has a few big downsides. It limits what America can offer.

这种可塑性也有几个很大的缺点。它限制了美国能提供的东西。

A cut in tariff⁹ rates, a plank¹⁰ of most free-trade deals, is a non-starter because it would require congressional support.

降低关税是大多数自由贸易协定的重要组成部分，但由于需要国会的支持，降低关税是不可能的。

America still vows¹¹ to push for strong labour and environmental standards but, unable to offer more access to its vast market, it lacks a key bargaining chip.

美国仍承诺推行强有力的劳工和环境标准，但由于无法让其他国家进入其广阔的市场，美国损失了一个关键的谈判筹码。

The durability¹² of the ipef is also in doubt.

ipef的持久性也存在疑问。

Were Mr Trump to return to the Oval Office in 2024, he would not need three days to ditch the framework.

如果特朗普在2024年重返白宫的椭圆形办公室(Oval Office)，不到3天他就会放弃该框架。

The Biden administration has tried to make a virtue¹³ of these limits.

拜登政府想要利用这些限制。

Rather than conceiving of the ipef as a conventional deal, it has declared that the pact will rest on four pillars, with trade promotion¹⁴ just one.

它没有把ipef设想成一项常规协议，而是宣称该协议有四个基本支柱，而贸易促进只是其中一个。

The other three goals are to make supply chains more resilient; to promote infrastructure¹⁵ investment and clean energy; and to form new rules on taxation¹⁶ and anti-corruption.

另外三个目标是让供应链更具弹性; 促进基础设施投资和清洁能源; 并制定税收和反腐败的新规则。

It is tempting¹⁷ to dismiss such a wide-ranging agenda as too vague to amount to anything.

人们很容易认为，这样一个涉猎广泛的议程太过模糊，没有任何意义。

But paradoxically, a near-stumble at the launch of the framework illustrated¹⁸ that it could, in theory, have force to its contents: America had to tone down the language in its founding documents, otherwise some in Asia would have balked¹⁹ at signing them.

但矛盾的是，框架启动时的一次差错表明，从理论上讲，它的内容是有力量的:美国必须淡化其创始文件中的语言，否则一些亚洲国家会拒绝签署这些文件。

Matthew Goodman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank, notes that the focus on topics such as digital trade, competition policy and bribery²⁰ makes for a good menu for the ipef.

智库战略与国际研究中心的马修·古德曼指出，对数字贸易、竞争政策和贿赂等话题的关注让ipef的内容看起来还不错。

“These are issues that are very much in the interest of our partners in the region,” he says. At the same time, breadth poses a challenge.

他表示:“这些问题非常符合我们在该地区的合作伙伴的利益。” 与此同时，框架的广度也带来了挑战。

Instead of just having the ustr as the lead negotiator, as in normal trade talks, the Commerce Department is in charge of the non-trade portfolio²¹.

与普通贸易谈判中只有美国贸易代表作为首席谈判代表不同，此次美国商务部负责的是非贸易部门。

That risks turning it into a multi-headed beast.

这就可能让该框架变成多元领导机制。

For now, many in the region are most pleased by the symbolism. The wounds from America’s tpp exit are still raw.

目前，该地区的许多国家对这一规定的象征意义最为满意。美国退出tpp的伤口仍未愈合。

Since Mr Biden’s election victory, allies have waited and waited for America to devise a new Asian trade strategy.

自拜登当选以来，盟友们一直在等待美国制定新的亚洲贸易战略。

At last it has arrived, even if it is more notable for its political constraints²² than its economic potential.

虽然政治约束比经济潜力更引人注目，但它最终还是到来了。

“We are just happy to have them at the table,” says one Australian official.

一位澳大利亚官员表示:“我们很高兴他们加入进来。”