2023年经济学人 贪婪的企业造成了通货膨胀吗?

（单词翻译）

 

 

    Finance & economics

    财经版块

    Capital v labour

    资本与劳工

    Are greedy corporations causing inflation?

    贪婪的企业导致了通货膨胀吗？

    In the three years before Covid-19, rich-world consumer prices rose by a total of 6%.

    在新冠肺炎暴发之前的三年里，富裕国家的消费价格总共上涨了6%。

    In the three years since they have risen by close to 20%.

    在那之后的三年里，消费价格已经上涨了近20%。

    People are looking for a villain¹ -- and firms often top the list.

    人们在找出坏蛋，而公司往往高居名单首位。

    According to a recent survey by Morning Consult, a pollster, a third of Americans believe that “companies’ attempts to maximise profits” have contributed “the most” to inflation, more than any other factor by far.

    根据民意调查公司晨间咨询最近的一项调查，三分之一的美国人认为“公司”追求利润最大化的努力对通货膨胀的贡献“最大”，远远超过了目前其他任何因素。

    It is not just the public who blame fat cats.

    指责有钱人的不只是公众。

    “Recent inflation has been driven by an unusual expansion of profit margins²,” Paul Donovan of UBS, a bank, has argued.

    “最近的通货膨胀是由利润率不同寻常的大幅增加而推动的。”瑞银银行的保罗·多诺万认为。

    A study by America’s Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) suggests “dealer mark-up” has raised the price of new vehicles.

    美国劳工统计局的一项研究表明，“经销商加价”提高了新车的价格。

    Central bankers are getting in on the act, too.

    各国央行官员也加入其行列。

    Last month Fabio Panetta of the European Central Bank said “there could be an increase in inflation due to increasing profits.”

    上个月，欧洲中央银行的法比奥·帕内塔说，“由于利润增加，通货膨胀可能会上升”。

    Last year Lael Brainard, formerly³ of the Federal Reserve, now a White House official, said that “reductions in mark-ups could also make an important contribution to reduced pricing pressures”.

    去年，莱尔·布雷纳德（之前在美联储任职，现为白宫官员）表示，“降低加价幅度也可以对减轻价格压力做出重要贡献”。

    The problem is that, at an aggregate⁴ level, evidence for head-honcho greed is thin on the ground.

    问题是，从总体上看，表明老板们贪婪的证据很少。

    What seems to be happening is that families and firms are sharing the spoils of the post-pandemic economy.

    看起来正在发生的情况是，家庭和公司正在分享后疫情经济带来的好处。

    This makes sense.

    这是有道理的。

    Arguments for “greedflation” rest on unsure theoretical ground.

    关于“贪婪膨胀”的论点，其理论依据并不确定。

    Firms did not suddenly become avaricious⁵.

    公司并不是突然变得贪婪。

    Red-hot demand, linked in part to massive stimulus⁶ programmes in 2020-21, is the true source of price pressure—and can sometimes result in margins expanding.

    在一定程度上与2020-21年的大规模刺激计划有关的火热需求，才是价格压力的真正来源，有时也会导致利润率扩大。

    The theory also fails on its own terms.

    贪婪膨胀理论本身也站不住脚。

    To believe that corporations are making out like bandits is to believe they are winning the fundamental battle in economics.

    认为企业在像强盗一样赚钱，就相当于认为企业打赢了经济学中的基本战役。

    Output must flow either to owners of capital -- in the form of profits, dividends⁷ and rents -- or to labour, as pay and perks⁸.

    产出必须要么以利润、股息和租金的形式流向资本所有者，要么以工资和津贴的形式流向劳动者。

    Economists⁹ refer to this as the “capital” or “labour” share of GDP.

    经济学家将其称为“资本”或“劳工”在GDP中所占的份额。

    When one group wins, by definition the other must lose.

    当其中一方赢了，那么根据定义，另一方肯定会输。

    We have estimated the labour share across the OECD, a group of mostly rich countries.

    我们估计了经合组织的劳工占GDP的比例，经合组织是一个主要由富裕国家组成的集团。

    For much of the pandemic this was above its average during the preceding decade, suggesting that labour had the upper hand.

    在疫情期间的大部分时间里，这一比例高于前十年的平均水平，表明劳工占据了上风。

    In 2020 companies continued to pay people’s wages -- helped by stimulus programmes -- even as GDP dropped.

    2020年，尽管GDP有所下降，在刺激计划的帮助下，企业继续支付人们的工资。

    In 2021 and 2022 strong demand for labour allowed many existing workers to demand more pay.

    2021年和2022年，对劳动力的强劲需求使许多现有工人能够要求更高的工资。

    It also pulled new people into the workforce¹⁰.

    还吸引了更多人进入劳动力大军。

    Across the OECD the share of working-age folk in a job is at an all-time high of 70%.

    在经合组织各成员国中，就业人口占劳动年龄人口的比例达到了70%的历史最高水平。

    Another way of assessing the balance of power is to look at “unit prices”.

    评估力量均衡情况的另一种方式是看“单价”。

    Recent changes in the price of an average American good or service can be split into the relative contributions of profits and labour costs.

    最近美国普通商品或服务的价格变化，可以划分为利润和劳动力成本对于价格的贡献。

    Corporations had the early spoils, but since 2021 workers have fought back.

    企业早早尝到了甜头，但2021年之后，劳动者们进行了反击。

    A calculation for the euro area published in a recent paper by Goldman Sachs, a bank, also suggests a relatively¹¹ even match-up.

    高盛银行最近发表的一篇论文对欧元区进行了计算，也表明企业和劳动者差不多旗鼓相当。

    If you are fuming¹² at paying $10 for a coffee, blame the barista serving it to you as much as the owner.

    如果你对花10美元买一杯咖啡感到恼火，那么你既要责怪店主，也要责怪端咖啡的服务员。

    Recent months have been tougher for companies.

    最近几个月，企业的日子更不好过。

    In the first quarter of this year profit margins at those in the S&P 500 index of big American firms are expected to sharply drop, perhaps because consumer tolerance¹³ for higher prices has worn thin.

    今年第一季度，美国标准普尔500指数的大型公司的利润率预计将大幅下降，可能是因为消费者对高价格的容忍度已经消磨殆尽。

    Workers, though, seem to be holding their own.

    不过，劳动者们似乎守住了自己的阵地。

    The OECD’s headline rate of inflation is now decisively declining, even as there is little evidence of slowing wage growth.

    经合组织的整体通货膨胀率现在正在明确地下降，尽管几乎没有证据表明工资增长在放缓。

    The latest monthly data from the BLS show that, after falling for much of 2021 and 2022, American hourly real pay is rising once again.

    劳工统计局的最新月度数据显示，美国实际时薪在2021年和2022年的大部分时间里都在下降，现在实际时薪又再次上升。

    David has not defeated Goliath, but he is putting up a good fight.

    大卫还没有击败歌利亚，但他打了一场漂亮的仗。