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MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:
Eight years is a long time - long enough for an American president to serve out two full terms and accumulate a long list of policy triumphs and mistakes. So it's notable what Barack Obama singled out as the worst mistake of his presidency1 - Libya. He says his worst mistake was his administration's lack of planning for the aftermath of the 2011 military intervention2 there. At first, when Libya's dictator, Moammar Gadhafi, was toppled, the country was seized by euphoria.
FREDERIC WEHREY: You had the blossoming of civil society. People were free to speak their own minds. They were able to organize themselves politically. And so it was quite easy to get swept up in that triumphal moment.
KELLY: That's Frederic Wehrey. He witnessed that triumphal moment firsthand, and then watched as it fell apart. Tribes and militias3 turned on each other. Libya descended5 into civil war, where he documents all this in a new book "The Burning Shores: Inside The Battle For The New Libya." He says the U.S. actually did draw up detailed6 plans to help Libya.
WEHREY: They had the plans, but the problem was the will to execute them. So this was an administration - the Obama administration undertook this intervention with the explicit7 goal of not being responsible for what followed it, of really abdicating8 responsibility for the post-conflict recovery and reconstruction9 to the Libyans themselves but also to the United Nations and the Europeans.
And for various reasons, those actors proved incapable10 or unwilling11 to handle the reconstruction. The U.N. had its own set of problems - bureaucratic12, structural13. The Libyans were divided about how much assistance they wanted. They did not want to repeat an Iraq-style occupation. But at the same time, they did want some assistance. So it was this real quandary14 about, how do you assist a country that really had no experience in governance?
KELLY: Yeah. I mean, I gather it's hard to overstate just how little experience and infrastructure15 there was after 40-something years of authoritarian16 rule.
WEHREY: Absolutely. It wasn't just authoritarian. I mean, Gadhafi ran it as his personal fiefdom. He centralized power. He personified power. So the basic muscle tissue of governance - I mean, ministries17, staffs, bureaucracies - just didn't work. So you found a lot of NGOs and outside diplomats18 that were trying to help the Libyans were so frustrated19 because they couldn't get traction20 with the Libyans on the other side. They didn't have a partner to work with. Libya couldn't absorb or utilize21 the assistance that was being given.
KELLY: The event of course that dominated front pages here in the U.S. about Libya was the death of Chris Stevens...
WEHREY: Absolutely.
KELLY: ...The U.S. ambassador to Libya who was killed in Benghazi in 2012. You knew Chris Stevens.
WEHREY: Briefly22. Briefly. Not that well, but...
KELLY: Oh.
WEHREY: ...We crossed paths at the embassy.
KELLY: As you sifted23 through and tried to investigate those much-investigated events, what strikes you? What leapt out?
WEHREY: Well, the great tragedy of this was that Ambassador Stevens was so committed to outreach to the Libyan people and to a particular practice of diplomacy24 that really meant getting out on the street and meeting people from all walks of life. And the great tragedy of that attack was that it constrained25 that approach. It curtailed26 it. There was a tremendous retreat or retrenchment27 of America's diplomatic presence.
And part of that was understandable for the need to safeguard lives. But part of it, unfortunately, was the partisanship28 - that this became so politicized back in Washington, D.C., that it affected29 America's ability to engage on the ground in Libya. And that's what I really took away from talking to Libyans, who said, look; what happened to you after this attack? And this is a real tragedy 'cause Chris would've wanted, you know, more engagement.
KELLY: What about the events of the actual night where he died in Benghazi? Was there anything as you tried to piece that together that strikes you?
WEHREY: The problem or what I found is that there were just really no good solutions or answers that night for who would protect the Americans. They were operating in a very fluid environment where there was no government in Benghazi to protect them. There was no army or police. They were at the whim30 of these militias. Many Libyans actually did try to help the Americans that night. And that story, I think, has not been told fully31. And I try to tell it in my book - that Libyans actually did try to come to the rescue of Chris. There were certain militias that helped the Americans evacuate32. And I think that that story needs to be told.
KELLY: After that, violence in Libya if anything got worse. You describe that by 2014, the country was in all-out civil war. And then when it just seemed as though things couldn't get worse after that, ISIS rolls in. And so you have this what had already been an immensely complicated civil war getting even more complicated.
WEHREY: Absolutely. You had, as you mentioned, this sort of splintering of the country into two camps into open civil war in the summer of 2014. That was exacerbated33 by regional states that were playing a very cynical34 game of arming and funding the different factions35 - Egypt, the UAE - United Arab Emirates - Qatar and Turkey. And then in the middle of this vacuum that was opened up, you had ISIS come.
And it was an obvious breeding ground for ISIS - a fractured state that already had a tradition of radicalism36, of jihadism. You had Libyans that went to Syria to fight that were coming back. And they were really the carriers of the ISIS virus, so to speak. And so quickly, ISIS spread across the country.
KELLY: Circle back to the U.S. role in all of this. Obama - President Obama saying this was the single biggest mistake of his presidency, which is quite something.
WEHREY: Yeah.
KELLY: What is U.S. policy now in Libya?
WEHREY: Unfortunately, it's hard to say. The U.S. has really dialed back. We don't have an ambassador. I would say...
KELLY: There's no U.S. ambassador in Tripoli.
WEHREY: There's no U.S. ambassador right now. I would say today it's primarily through the lens of counterterrorism.
KELLY: The fight against ISIS.
WEHREY: Exactly. And also more recently al-Qaida, as we've seen from some strikes in the south. The Americans are still supporting the U.N. process. There's a very strong U.N. envoy37 that's making some ground in terms of brokering38 talks. And I think the United States needs to support that even more.
KELLY: Well, walk me forward to where we sit now in 2018. I've never been to Libya. If I flew into Tripoli today, what would I see? What does it look like?
WEHREY: You would see an airport that is functional39 but certainly not like an airport that you're used to in the United States or a Western country.
KELLY: Does it feel like a country at war?
WEHREY: It does not. There are encouraging signs of normalcy in Tripoli.
KELLY: So markets are open.
WEHREY: Markets are open.
KELLY: Cars are in the streets. People are in parks.
WEHREY: There are sports clubs. You know, universities are open. But there is deep trauma40. I mean, there's huge problems with medical care. You have Libyans actually joining those migrant flows across the Mediterranean41. They're so desperate to leave. A lot of Libyans have left. You have rampant42 lawlessness. So on the surface when you go there, it seems OK. But there is a lot of kidnapping. There's a lot of criminality. And there are militia4 fights that can break out at any time in the capital over turf for various reasons. So things can go bad very, very quickly. So the calm you encounter on first sight is often...
KELLY: Superficial.
KELLY: Frederic Wehrey, thanks very much.
WEHREY: My pleasure. Thank you for having me.
KELLY: Frederic Wehrey - he is senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His new book is "The Burning Shores: Inside The Battle For The New Libya."
(SOUNDBITE OF BRUCE COCKBURN'S "THE END OF ALL RIVERS")
1 presidency | |
n.总统(校长,总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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2 intervention | |
n.介入,干涉,干预 | |
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3 militias | |
n.民兵组织,民兵( militia的名词复数 ) | |
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4 militia | |
n.民兵,民兵组织 | |
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5 descended | |
a.为...后裔的,出身于...的 | |
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6 detailed | |
adj.详细的,详尽的,极注意细节的,完全的 | |
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7 explicit | |
adj.详述的,明确的;坦率的;显然的 | |
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8 abdicating | |
放弃(职责、权力等)( abdicate的现在分词 ); 退位,逊位 | |
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9 reconstruction | |
n.重建,再现,复原 | |
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10 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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11 unwilling | |
adj.不情愿的 | |
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12 bureaucratic | |
adj.官僚的,繁文缛节的 | |
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13 structural | |
adj.构造的,组织的,建筑(用)的 | |
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14 quandary | |
n.困惑,进迟两难之境 | |
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15 infrastructure | |
n.下部构造,下部组织,基础结构,基础设施 | |
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16 authoritarian | |
n./adj.专制(的),专制主义者,独裁主义者 | |
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17 ministries | |
(政府的)部( ministry的名词复数 ); 神职; 牧师职位; 神职任期 | |
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18 diplomats | |
n.外交官( diplomat的名词复数 );有手腕的人,善于交际的人 | |
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19 frustrated | |
adj.挫败的,失意的,泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 );挫败;使受挫折;令人沮丧 | |
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20 traction | |
n.牵引;附着摩擦力 | |
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21 utilize | |
vt.使用,利用 | |
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22 briefly | |
adv.简单地,简短地 | |
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23 sifted | |
v.筛( sift的过去式和过去分词 );筛滤;细查;详审 | |
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24 diplomacy | |
n.外交;外交手腕,交际手腕 | |
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25 constrained | |
adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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26 curtailed | |
v.截断,缩短( curtail的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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27 retrenchment | |
n.节省,删除 | |
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28 Partisanship | |
n. 党派性, 党派偏见 | |
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29 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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30 whim | |
n.一时的兴致,突然的念头;奇想,幻想 | |
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31 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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32 evacuate | |
v.遣送;搬空;抽出;排泄;大(小)便 | |
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33 exacerbated | |
v.使恶化,使加重( exacerbate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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34 cynical | |
adj.(对人性或动机)怀疑的,不信世道向善的 | |
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35 factions | |
组织中的小派别,派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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36 radicalism | |
n. 急进主义, 根本的改革主义 | |
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37 envoy | |
n.使节,使者,代表,公使 | |
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38 brokering | |
v.做掮客(或中人等)( broker的现在分词 );作为权力经纪人进行谈判;以中间人等身份安排… | |
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39 functional | |
adj.为实用而设计的,具备功能的,起作用的 | |
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40 trauma | |
n.外伤,精神创伤 | |
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41 Mediterranean | |
adj.地中海的;地中海沿岸的 | |
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42 rampant | |
adj.(植物)蔓生的;狂暴的,无约束的 | |
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43 deceptive | |
adj.骗人的,造成假象的,靠不住的 | |
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