2022年经济学人 俄乌危机引发的粮食恐慌(2)

（单词翻译）

Future crops are an even bigger worry. In Ukraine the war may result in lower yields and area planted.

农作物的未来更令人担忧。在乌克兰，战争可能会导致产量和种植面积的下降。

Winter crops such as wheat and barley¹, which are sown in October, could be smaller because of a lack of fertiliser and pesticides².

由于缺乏化肥和杀虫剂，小麦和大麦等10月份播种的冬季作物产量可能会减少。

Spring crops such as corn and sunflowers, the planting of which would normally start imminently³, may not get sown at all.

像玉米和向日葵这样的春季作物通常很快就会开始种植，但现在也许根本就不会播种了。

Leonid Tsentilo, whose farm in central Ukraine grows 7,000 tonnes of wheat a year, says local prices for diesel⁴ and plant-protection products have risen by 50% in two weeks. Some of his workers have been shipped off to war.

列昂尼德·岑提洛每年在乌克兰中部的农场种植7000吨小麦，他说当地的柴油和植物保护剂的价格在两周内上涨了50%。他的一些工人被派去打仗了。

In Russia the risk is not curtailed⁵ production but blockaded exports. Although food sales are not yet subject to sanctions, Western banks are reluctant to lend to traders.

而俄罗斯的风险不在于减产，而在于出口受阻。尽管食品销售尚未受到制裁，但西方银行不愿向贸易商放贷。

Fear of being fined by governments in the West or shamed by its press is keeping merchants at bay. While Ukraine is “unreachable”, Russia is “untouchable”, says Michael Magdovitz of Rabobank.

由于担心被西方政府罚款或被媒体羞辱，商人们都不敢妄动。荷兰合作银行的迈克尔·马格多维茨表示，乌克兰是“不可到达的”，而俄罗斯则是“摸都摸不得的”。

Most alarming will be the conflict's impact on agriculture worldwide. The region is a big supplier of critical fertiliser components⁶, including natural gas and potash.

最令人担忧的将是冲突对全球农业的影响。冲突发生的地区是包括天然气和钾肥在内的关键化肥成分的重要供应地。

Fertiliser prices had already doubled or tripled, depending on the type, even before the war, owing to rising energy and transport costs and sanctions imposed in 2021 on Belarus, which produces 18% of the world's potash, as it cracked down on dissidents.

由于能源和运输成本的上涨，以及白俄罗斯因为意见不同，在2021年遭遇制裁后，化肥价格甚至在战前就已经翻了一倍或两倍，具体价格取决于化肥的种类。白俄罗斯的钾肥产量占全球的18%。

As Russia, which accounts for 20% of global output, finds it harder to export its own potash, prices are sure to rise further.

占全球总产量20%的俄罗斯发现自己的钾肥出口越来越难，钾肥价格肯定会进一步上涨。

Since four-fifths of the world's potash is traded internationally, the impact of price spikes⁸ will be felt in every agricultural region in the world, warns Humphrey Knight⁹ of cru, a consultancy.

咨询公司CRU的汉弗莱·奈特警告称，由于全球五分之四的钾肥都是国际交易，全球所有农业地区都将感受到钾肥价格飙升的影响。

As a result of all this, a much greater share of incomes will soon be spent on food.

所有这一切导致的结果是，人们会在食品上花费越来越多的收入。

This will be felt most acutely in the Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia, where some 800m people depend heavily on Black Sea wheat.

中东、非洲和亚洲部分地区受到的影响最为严重，在这些地区，约有8亿人严重依赖黑海小麦。

That includes Turkey, which supplies much of the southern Mediterranean¹⁰ with flour. Egypt usually buys 70% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine.

其中包括土耳其，它向地中海南部大部分地区供应面粉。埃及通常从俄罗斯和乌克兰购买70%的小麦。

The latter alone accounts for half of Lebanon's wheat imports. Many others can hardly do without Ukraine's corn, soyabeans and vegetable oil.

仅后者就占黎巴嫩小麦进口的一半。其他许多国家离不开乌克兰的玉米、大豆和植物油。

Meanwhile higher fertiliser and energy costs will crimp farmers' margins¹¹ everywhere.

与此同时，更高的化肥和能源成本将挤压各地农民的利润。

Brazil, a huge producer of meat and agricultural products, imports 46% of its potash from either Russia or Belarus, says Cristiano Veloso of Verde AgriTech, a Brazilian startup.

巴西一家新兴公司Verde AgriTech的克里斯蒂亚诺·维罗索说，作为肉类和农产品的巨大生产国，巴西46%的碳酸钾是从俄罗斯或白俄罗斯进口的。

Eventually some of the costs will be passed on to the consumer.

最终，部分成本将转嫁到消费者身上。

Protectionism may pour more fuel on the fire. National restrictions¹² on fertiliser exports increased last year and could accelerate.

保护主义可能会火上浇油。去年，全国对化肥出口的限制有所增加，而且可能会加速。

Limits on food exports, or panic-buying by importers, could trigger a price spike⁷ of the kind that sparked riots in dozens of countries in 2007-08.

对食品出口的限制，或进口商的恐慌性购买，可能会引发价格飙升，就像2007-08年在几十个国家引发骚乱那样。

On March 8th and 9th, respectively, Russia and Ukraine banned wheat exports. Argentina, Hungary, Indonesia and Turkey have announced food-export restrictions in recent days.

3月8日和9日，俄罗斯和乌克兰分别禁止小麦出口。阿根廷、匈牙利、印度尼西亚和土耳其最近几天都宣布了食品出口限制。

There is no easy fix. Some of the 160m tonnes of wheat used as animal feed every year could be diverted for human consumption, but substitution may export inflation to other staples¹³.

对于这些问题，没有简单的解决办法。每年在动物饲料上消耗的1.6亿吨小麦中，有一部分可能会转移到人类消费上，但替代品可能会将通胀转移到其它主食上。

Increasing production in Europe and America and drawing on India's vast strategic stockpile may yield 10-15m tonnes—a substantial quantity, but less than a third of Ukraine's and Russia's combined annual exports.

在欧洲和美洲增加产量，并利用印度庞大的战略储备，可能能产出1000 - 1500万吨——这个量相当大，但还不及乌克兰和俄罗斯年度出口量的三分之一。

Some could come from farther afield but there are bottlenecks¹⁴: efforts to export more of Australia's bumper¹⁵ winter-wheat crop have clogged¹⁶ the supply chains between its farms and ports.

还有一些粮食可能来自更远的地方，但也存在瓶颈：出口更多澳大利亚丰产的冬小麦的努力已经堵塞了农场和港口之间的供应链。

With corn, governments may resort to appropriating some of the 148m tonnes used as bioethanol feed to help plug this year's likely shortfall of 35m tonnes.

至于玉米，政府可能会动用1.48亿吨玉米中的一部分作为生物乙醇饲料，以填补今年可能出现的3500万吨玉米短缺。

Fertiliser shortages are even harder to cover: new potash mines take 5-10 years to build.

化肥短缺则更难解决：新的钾肥矿需要5-10年才能建成。

The war in Ukraine is already a tragedy. As it ravages¹⁷ the world's breadbasket, a calamity¹⁸ looms¹⁹.

乌克兰战争本就是一场悲剧。当它波及到世界粮仓的时候，一场灾难又在逼近。